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EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON 
THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PRO· 
CESS. By John H. Beckstrom. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
1989. Pp. 142. $24.95. 
In the wake of the legal realists and their successors, there has been 
a decline in faith in legal determinism - the view that judicial deci· 
sionmaking can be based on principles and rules that originate solely 
from within the legal discipline. This loss of faith has led scholars to 
look for legitimate bases of judicial and social policymaking in nonle· 
gal disciplines, such as philosophy, economics, and sociology. These 
scholars hope to derive from these disciplines (preferably neutral) 
principles to guide authoritative decisionmaking. Theories of "natural 
law" and "popular consensus," grounded largely in philosophy and 
ethics, remain suspect as principled lawmaking guides, but have 
proved durable in some areas of the law. 1 Scholars have also debated 
(to death, perhaps) the contours, strengths and weaknesses of eco· 
nomic theory applied to law, debating both its descriptive powers and 
prescriptive legitimacy.2 
The use of the natural sciences in the law is less well·established, at 
least if "established" can be defined as what students are exposed to in 
the law school curriculum. Nevertheless, in 1985, John H. Beck· 
strom3 showed how a sociobiological theory of human behavior (mod· 
1. For one example of the use of societal consensus to support judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution, see the various concurring and dissenting opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972). Furman held that Georgia's death sentencing statute violated the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. Justice Brennan, concurring, argued that the death penalty itself is "cruel 
and unusual punishment," and based this conclusion in part on grounds that "[a]t the very least 
•.. contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt." 408 U.S. at 300 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall would have struck down the death penalty as "cruel and 
unusual" because he believed "that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the 
material already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional." 
408 U.S. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring). At least three of the four dissenting opinions in 
Furman implicitly or explicitly agreed that consensus about moral principles provides a frame-
work for policymaking. Two dissents, however, argued that the Court is not in a position to 
discern what the consensus, if any, is about capital punishment. In the absence of a clear consen-
sus, the Court should defer to legislatures that, supposedly, reflect what consensus does exist. 
408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 436-37 (Powell, J., dissenting). One dissent 
argued that consensus provides a basis for legislative, not judicial, action. 408 U.S. at 410-11 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, consensus was both a reason for the Court to intervene (for the 
majority) and a reason not to_(for the dissenters). 
2. For a thorough defense of the descriptive powers of economic analysis as applied to law, 
see R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). For an argument in favor of the 
normative application of efficiency analysis to law, see R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 
(1981). For criticism of such an application, see Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J, LEGAL 
STUD. 191 (1980), and Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). 
3. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
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em Darwinism) might usefully be applied to legal problems.4 Now, in 
Evolutionary Jurisprudence, Beckstrom builds on his earlier analysis, 
assessing more precisely the immediate and prospective powers of 
sociobiology to inform lawmaking. 5 The result is a provocative, often 
interesting essay. Nevertheless, the reader is left wondering whether 
sociobiology can really provide guidance in the formation of judicial 
rules, legislation, and social policy, even if its explanation of human 
behavior is accurate. 6 
Beckstrom begins by explaining the concepts and hypotheses of 
modem Darwinism that are relevant to the law. Most important is a 
basic tenet of modem Darwinism: "We human gene carriers are 
programmed to head toward a definite ultimate goal - optimum 
proliferation of our genetic package - and we must bounce off, adjust 
to, and utilize what we encounter in our particular environments as we 
head toward that goal" (p. 12). 
Springing from this central thesis are two other hypotheses. They 
are particularly relevant to the law because they posit fairly specific 
human behavioral tendencies. 7 "Kin selection" is the idea that 
humans are programmed to give aid more readily to persons whose 
genetic package more closely resembles their own (pp. 8-9). For ex-
ample, sociobiologists would predict that if I had to choose, I would 
save the life of a parent, fifty percent of whose genes are identical to 
my own, rather than an aunt or uncle of the same age, with whom 
only twenty-five percent of my genetic package is identical. "Recipro-
cal altruism" is the idea that some aid-giving activities that do not 
directly enhance genetic proliferation can nevertheless be explained by 
the expected return to one's own genetic package through future fa-
vors. So, we humans are programmed to give aid more readily to 
those who are more likely to give aid in the future to us and to our 
closest genetic replicas (p. 11). 
In the middle chapters, Beckstrom explores how these and other 
sociobiological concepts might assist judges, legislators, and other so-
cial policymakers. Beckstrom seems most comfortable using sociobi-
ology to help to identify areas in which methodical observation of 
4. J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985). 
5. "Lawmaking" and "lawmakers" will be referred to frequently in this book notice. The 
terms are used in a general sense to include judicial decisionmaking, the enactment of laws by 
legislators, and social policymaking in general. 
6. Beckstrom also seeks to demonstrate how legal opinions might provide a fruitful source of 
inquiry for sociobiologists, and identifies the need both law and sociobiology have for empirical 
research. P. 24. Chapter 7 is devoted to exploring the uses that might be made oflegal materials 
in sociobiological research, Pp. 96-127. Because this book notice addresses the legal community, 
it only assesses the application of sociobiology to law. 
7. Beckstrom describes sociobiology's relevance to the law this way: "The potential value to 
the legal process rests .•. in instructing all of us • . . on the facts of natural history that bear on 
the predictability of human behavior when knowledge of such predictability is important to the 
resolution of social problems." P. 4. 
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typical human behavior might better inform lawmakers and judges 
(pp. 19-24). In deciding cases (or enacting legislation), judges (and 
legislators) often rely, at least in part, on their own beliefs about typi-
cal human behavior. These judgments are based upon what may be 
inadequate information or upon methodologically suspect analyses of 
information that is available. 8 When these beliefs conflict with soci-
obiological predictions of human behavior, judges and legislators, as 
well as sociobiologists, should be interested in studies that will help to 
determine who is correct.9 Beckstrom sees immediate value in using 
sociobiology "to prompt empirical research on actual typical behavior 
important to the law . . . . The theory would ... be used as a signal, in 
a given case, that a study of actual behavior should be commissioned" 
(p. 24). 
Beckstrom also sees immediate use for evolutionist theory in "ex-
posing unconscious self-serving lawmaking" (pp. 76-95). Here the fo-
cus is on what sociobiology can tell us about the people who enact 
laws and social policies. Sociobiology can help us see when policy-
makers are serving their own interests because, Beckstrom says, it ex-
pands the concept of self-interest in two ways. First, the notions of kin 
selection (p. 78) and reciprocal altruism (p. 79) provide a working defi-
nition of self-interest. We can identify ulterior, self-interested motives 
on the part of a politician, for example, by showing that the choice of 
one policy will help proliferate that politician's genetic package (either 
directly or indirectly through reciprocal altruism) to a greater extent 
than the alternative policy. Second, Beckstrom adds a fascinating ex-
planation of "evolved self-deception" - the idea that the most decep-
tive people are those who do not even realize they are being deceptive. 
According to Beckstrom, because "good" deceivers tend to survive 
and proliferate relatively well, and because self-deception is a charac-
teristic of the most successful deceivers, self-deception has evolved as a 
genetically programmed human characteristic (pp. 80-82). This some-
what frightening idea expands our understanding of self-interested 
lawmaking by suggesting that the self-interest involved in judicial or 
legislative choices may be quite unintentional. Beckstrom concludes 
8. The existence of these judicial or legislative "intuitions" is explicitly recognized in former 
Chief Justice Burger's comment that "[t]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and 
judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions." Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49, 61 (1973). That case involved first amendment scrutiny of a Georgia restriction on showing 
pornographic films to consenting adults. The Chief Justice relied on "[t]he sum of experience," 
413 U.S. at 63, to support the link drawn between pornography and antisocial behavior and 
thereby certify a legitimate state interest in the restrictions at issue. The example is not offered 
because sociobiological inquiry would be particularly useful in testing what the Chief Justice 
claims "[t]he sum of experience" actually tells us. It is offered rather to suggest that there has 
been a great deal of sociological and psychological research exploring the link between antisocial 
behavior and exposure to sexually explicit or violent material. This research, reflecting methods 
of inquiry that are far more sophisticated than are "intuition and experience," may aid our think-
ing, even if people cannot agree on what has been proved. 
9. See supra note 6. 
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that this expanded concept of self-interest can serve as a basis for a 
more forthright and credible legal and political system. "Even if ob-
scure self-interest of the lawmakers were first detected and alleged by 
others, avoidance or reform of the law might be facilitated if 
lawmakers generally become aware of sociobiology" (p. 82). At the 
least, lawmakers would be under greater pressure to justify laws that 
are self-serving under the expanded sociobiological definition (p. 83). 
Beckstrom also suggests that sociobiology may have direct uses in 
the law - direct in the sense that the empirical foundation of the 
relevant sociobiological theory of human behavior is so well estab-
lished that it can be assumed for lawmaking purposes. Here, however, 
Beckstrom is far more cautious. He warns that direct application of 
evolutionist principles must await the achievement of a substantial 
consensus among sociobiologists on concepts and hypotheses and em-
pirical testing of those concepts and hypotheses. Only then may 
lawmakers rely on sociobiological theories to correct their intuitions 
about human behavior (pp. 24-25). He also points out that direct uses 
of evolutionism need not, and should not, be mistaken for normative 
statements about what the goals of society ought to be (pp. 35-36). 
Finally, Beckstrom devotes Chapter 5 to cautioning the reader that 
genetic input to behavior may be more difficult to detect than cultural 
input.IO 
Within these constraints, Beckstrom suggests that sociobiological 
models, applied to legal problems, might (1) facilitate the achievement 
of independently set societal goals and (2) help estimate the sociobio-
logical "human costs" of various courses of action. Beckstrom dem-
onstrates the "facilitative" function by explaining how sociobiological 
theory suggests that using DNA fingerprinting to test paternity might 
encourage broader compliance with child support orders even if such a 
test cannot "prove" paternity to a legal certainty. The sociobiological 
hypothesis here is that a man's willingness to provide child support 
will vary in direct relation to that man's beliefthat the child is actually 
his biological offspring. Empirical studies showing a statistical link 
between promiscuity and absence of paternal aid-giving behavior in 
the societies studied support that theory (pp. 48-53). If these and fur-
ther observations lead to acceptance of this "paternity confidence" 
theory, 11 and if society's independently set goal is to encourage maxi-
mum compliance with court orders of child support, then sociobiology 
might be applied directly to argue for the use of DNA fingerprinting 
to prove paternity.12 · 
10. Pp. 55-57. The concept of biocu/tural input, in which genetic and environmental expla-
nations of behavior overlap and mix, is also explored. See pp. 30-33. 
11. Beckstrom suggests that the theory might be tested by a study comparing support pay-
ments by men subject to "in-wedlock" and "out-of-wedlock" court orders. P. 52. 
12. Beckstrom actually presents the idea of showing DNA tests to fathers as an optional 
solution that is brought to light through the use of sociobiological theory. It has been presented 
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Were Beckstrom's sole purpose in Evolutionary Jurisprudence to 
explore the limitations of sociobiology as applied to the law, it would 
have to be considered a success. Beckstrom makes the case against the 
use of "normative" evolutionism effectively (but I imagine this case is 
a fairly easy sell anyway). He also is persuasive in arguing that before 
using sociobiology to answer specific legal problems, lawmakers 
should accurately interpret relevant biological research and must cau-
tiously assess the relative importance of genetic and cultural contribu-
tions to human behavior. 
Beckstrom's stated goal, however, is to identify areas of overlap of 
law and sociobiology that might serve as bases of "cross-fertilization" 
(p. 3). Thus Beckstrom's point in exploriD.g the limits of sociobiology 
in the law is probably to suggest areas in which it will be helpful, 
rather than to emphasize those areas in which it will not be.13 In this 
endeavor Beckstrom's success is far more limited. 
First, the immediate use for sociobiology that Beckstrom identifies 
- to suggest areas where empirical research of interest to lawmakers 
might be undertaken - says nothing about why sociobiology is 
uniquely suited, compared with other disciplines, to lend such aid to 
lawmakers. As Beckstrom implies, sociobiological theory need not be 
"correct" or accepted to perform this initial function. 14 One might 
envision myriad theories of human behavior - economic analysis, 
psychological analysis, even anecdotal intuition - that, when in con-
flict with a lawmaker's determination about how humans actually be-
have, should similarly evoke interest in further empirical analysis. 15 
Beckstrom himself hints at this when, in the introduction to the essay, 
he mentions that, while his targeted readers are lawyers and natural 
scientists, "I hope the book will reach social scientists as well" (p. 2). 
The call, then, is not so much for the use of sociobiology as for more 
here as an example of the facilitative function of sociobiology identified earlier in the book, but, 
at least in the confines of the "paternity confidence" example, the two uses appear to merge. 
13. Beckstrom states as much in the introduction to chapter 5: 
Here I will demonstrate how sociobiology may often, even when fully developed, fail to be of 
assistance in assessing or predicting typical behavior. That insight should serve as a caution, 
but also help us better appreciate the circumstances under which sociobiology does hold 
potential for predicting typical behavior. 
P. 55. 
14. Beckstrom does not state this explicitly, but the notion that sociobiological theory need 
not be correct in order to be useful in identifying areas for useful empirical research can be 
inferred, and follows logically, from his suggestion that such empirical research "could also serve 
as tests of the behavioral hypotheses that prompt the research •..• " P. 24. 
15. This is not to say that we could not or should not rank such theories based on how 
compelling they are in logic. There may be theories of human behavior with which we are un-
comfortable because they have not been proved reliable, but which seem sensible and promising 
enough to warrant expenditure of resources for further empirical work when the research may 
help solve a legal or social problem. This may be what Beckstrom has in mind when he refers to 
the indirect uses of sociobiology. He does not say so explicitly, and even if he did, Beckstrom's 
lack of exploration of sociobiology purely as a theory would leave one wondering where Beck-
strom thinks sociobiology should stand in ranking such theories. 
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empirical observation to inform decisionmaking. Very few would 
question the value of empirical observation of human behavior, but 
why does sociobiology provide a useful way to order those 
observations? 
Second, Beckstrom's extensive attempts to downplay or deny the 
normative implications of sociobiology in the law are unsuccessful. 
That he would want to downplay the normative implications of soci-
obiology is understandable given the poor reputation of a very famous 
normative biological theory, social Darwinism. But Beckstrom's de-
nial of sociobiology's normative thrust is unpersuasive. He admits 
that the uses he sees for sociobiology in social engineering may fall 
into the murky area between description and prescription, but re-
sponds that 
what social planners would take from natural science, and use in the 
evaluation process, is facts about the root causes of behavior and factual 
information on, or estimates of, human costs. The "logic, ethics, and 
aesthetics" needed to make tentative and ultimate goal choices would 
have to be found elsewhere. [p. 41; footnotes omitted] 
This response may be plausible when we are speaking purely about 
how sociobiology might be used to facilitate the achievement of inde-
pendently set societal goals. But Beckstrom's implicit contention that 
"human cost" estimation can be viewed for practical purposes as with-
out normative implication is harder to swallow. To convert sociobio-
logical theory about human behavior into estimates of "human cost" 
for purposes of policymaking implies not only the acceptance of the 
theory, which Beckstrom fairly assumes for purposes of this book, but 
also that there is a social value to these human costs that should not be 
ignored in determining policy. It is true that "is" and "ought" are not 
the same thing, but on some points their confluence is unavoidable: 
human costs, of which sociobiology would provide an accounting, are 
"facts" that have normative implications. 
What is missing, then, is an explanation of how sociobiology offers 
an explanation of human behavior that is persuasive enough to com-
pete with or complement other explanations. While it is easy enough 
to conceptualize areas in which that may be the case, this book pur-
posefully avoids that issue. To be fair, Beckstrom does, in one para-
graph, address the question "why sociobiology?": 
I would expect initial resistance to such direct use of substantiated 
sociobiology to come from members of the legal profession who have 
had experience in dealing with witnesses expert in what one might call 
"soft" science. Lawyers have found, for example, that expert opinions as 
to when someone should be considered insane and thus legally irrespon-
sible have been based on shifting sands. From this and similar exper-
iences, judges, in particular, have become wary of the social sciences, 
often preferring to rely on their own impressions or those of lay jurors. 
For good reason, they have generally been more receptive to information 
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from "hard" sciences like mathematics and physics. Sociobiology is so-
cial science in that it addresses human interactive behavior; however, its 
foundations are in genetics, mathematics, and the economic logic of nat-
ural processes. Its way of looking at the world is congenial to those 
trained, as lawyers are, in logical analysis. . . . I suspect that as growing 
numbers of lawyers learn sociobiology, the problem will not be to con-
vince them to use it 'in their profession, but rather to wait until it has 
been well tested. [p. 25; footnotes omitted] 
Because no further exploration of these ideas is offered, it is' diffi-
cult to assess the validity of Beckstrom's claims. It is unclear why 
congeniality "to those trained, as lawyers are, in logical analysis" is a 
virtue rather than a vice where, as seems to be the case here, the search 
is for principles that are not susceptible to legalistic manipulation. In 
any event, it is the exploration of these issues that is needed. 
- Steven Kasten 
